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Abstract: Recent studies suggest that firms may gain from global sourcing of 
innovative activities. Yet, only a small number of firms offshore their R&D, design, and 
engineering tasks. To explain this selection pattern, this paper examines the heterogeneity 
in total factor productivity among a large group of European firms. The results suggest 
that those firms that offshore their innovative activities tend to be more productive than 
domestic firms, exporters, and other multinational corporations. This finding implies that 
firms with superior productivity are more likely to exploit the global task distribution in 
innovative activities, which may provide an explanation for why such low participation is 
observed in the data.  
 






















1     Introduction 
The organization of innovative activities has for long been an important subject in the 
Economics of Innovation. Some of the key questions in this line of research relate to the 
choices that firms make with regard to performing their innovative tasks in-house versus 
distributing them among other parties. Those parties, who may or may not be affiliated 
with the firms, are either located in the same country where the main firm is located, or 
they are located in a foreign country. In fact, distributing innovative activities among 
foreign parties has recently become an increasing trend. For example, a recent report by 
National Science Board (2016, Ch. 4) suggests that in 2012 the amount of R&D 
performed by the affiliates of foreign multinationals in the US ($48 billion) was about 
16% of the entire R&D performed by businesses in the US ($302.3 billion). In 1997, this 
share was about 11%. This report also suggests that European multinationals play an 
important role in global sourcing of innovative activities. More than half of the R&D 
performed by the affiliates of foreign multinationals in the US in 2012 were allocated by 
firms owned by European parent companies that are based in Switzerland (20%), the UK 
(14%), France (14%), and Germany (12%).  
When it comes to performing innovative activities offshore, previous research suggest 
that firms are motivated by demand- and supply-driven incentives. On the demand side, 
firms are more likely to be able to adapt their products to the preferences of their foreign 
customers when they perform their innovative activities offshore (Cantwell and Mudambi 
2005). As for the supply-driven incentives, firms are likely to lower the cost of their 
innovative activities (Lai, Riezman, and Wang 2009). They may also be able to take 
advantage of potential R&D spillovers (Feinberg and Gupta 2004), expertise (Martinez-
Noya, Garcia-Canal, and Guillen 2012), and qualified personnel (Lewin, Massini, and 
Peeters 2009) in foreign countries.1  
Previous studies also suggest that firms gain from global sourcing of their innovative 
activities. These gains are evident when measures of firms' performance, such as return 
on equity and return on sale, are examined (Ceci and Masciarelli 2010). They are also 
evident when measures of firms' innovation output are examined. Notably, Kotabe et al. 
																																																								
1	See Jabbour and Zuniga (2016) and Nieto and Rodrìguez (2011) for a detailed survey of the underlying 
motives behind the offshoring of innovation.	
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(2007) find that greater international knowledge content contributes to the innovation 
output. Also, Nieto and Rodrìguez (2011) suggest that the offshoring of R&D tasks may 
positively affect innovative performance of the firms, as measured by the propensity to 
innovate. Along with the gains in terms of the extensive margin of innovation output (i.e., 
whether a firm innovates), Tabrizy (2015) suggests that the offshoring of innovative tasks 
(e.g., R&D, design, and engineering services) may also contribute to the intensive margin 
of innovation, as measured by the share of innovative product sales in total turnover.2  
Despite the above motives and potential gains, only a small number of firms offshore 
their innovative tasks. For example, Jabbour and Zuinga (2016), who examine a survey 
compiled by the French Statistics Office for Research and Innovation, find that only 12% 
of R&D performers in France are involved in international R&D sourcing. This low 
participation rate may be caused by some intellectual property concerns (e.g., Lai et al. 
2009 and Garcìa-Vega and Huergo 2011), which can be explained using property right 
models of firm boundaries. The model developed by Antràs (2003), for instance, suggests 
that the transaction cost of performing innovative activities offshore could be relatively 
high at the equilibrium.3 Thus, firms with offshore innovative efforts are more likely to 
internalize those activities via foreign direct investments (henceforth, FDI), so they can 
manage the intellectual property risks. Also, given the predictions in Antràs and Helpman 
(2004), firms that are involved in FDI are expected to be very productive. These 
predictions imply that offshoring R&D, design, and engineering services are expected to 
be done via FDI and by the most productive Multinational Corporations (henceforth, 
MNCs). Tabrizy (2015, pp. 310-313) provides detailed information, suggesting that the 
majority of European MNCs that offshore their innovative activities tend to rely on FDI. 
Yet, the superior productivity of MNCs with offshore innovative activities had remained 
unexplored. 
																																																								
2	Since greater innovative product sales may contribute to productivity (Crèpon, Duguet, and Mairessec 
1998) and profitability (Roberts 1999), it is important to examine the gains in terms of the intensive margin 
of innovation output as well as the extensive margin.	
3	This is not an explicit finding in Antràs (2003) since he broadly examines capital- vs. labor-intensive 
tasks. Yet, it provides valuable insight into the possibility of relatively high cost for the offshoring of 
innovative activities. These tasks typically require a great amount of investment in R&D equipment and 
highly skilled labor force, and they are expected to be performed at the headquarters. Offshoring those 
activities is, therefore, expected to be very costly.	
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Fortunately, the relationship between firms' productivity and their international 
activities has been widely studied in International Economics. It is now well established 
that the most productive firms are more likely to partake in international activities such as 
exporting (Melitz 2003), FDI (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004), and other forms of 
global sourcing (Antràs and Helpman 2004).4 This selection enables us to explain some 
interesting patterns that are observed in the data. In particular, it helps us understand why 
only a small number of firms partake in international activities such as exporting, 
importing, and global sourcing of productive and innovative tasks. 
In this paper, I examine the superior productivity of the firms that exploit the global 
task distribution in innovative activities. The working hypothesis of this paper is as 
follows: Those MNCs that offshore their innovative tasks are more productive than 
MNCs that offshore their non-innovative tasks. Also, since MNCs are in general more 
productive, MNCs with offshore innovative activities are expected to be more productive 
than exporters as well as firms that only serve the domestic markets. 
Employing a recent European firm-level survey, this paper contributes to the 
literature by estimating the productivity premium of the firms that are actively involved 
in offshoring different types of tasks, including the production of finished products, the 
production of semi-finished products/components, and R&D, design, and engineering 
services. I employ kernel density estimations, along with linear and ordered Probit 
estimations to test whether those firms that offshore their R&D, design, and engineering 
services are more productive than others. The results suggest that compared to other firms 
in the full sample and the sub-sample of MNCs, those firms that offshore their innovative 
activities enjoy greater productivity. This finding may provide an answer to the puzzle 
above: though MNCs gain from the offshoring of innovation, they must be very 
productive in order to be able to offshore their innovative activities, which is why only a 
small number of MNCs are able to successfully partake in the global sourcing of 
innovative tasks. 
This empirical exercise does not address any causality questions. To examine the 
causality relationship, one needs to design a randomized trial or to use some exogenous 
																																																								
4	See Bernard et al. (2012) for a recent survey of empirical findings on firm heterogeneity in international 
trade.	
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variations that can predict whether a firm distributes it innovative tasks across the globe. 
Unfortunately, I do not have access to any of the above. Nonetheless, in this paper, I am 
able to explore some interesting patterns that appear in the data by estimating the 
productivity premium of those MNCs that distribute their innovative tasks abroad. 
In what follows, previous empirical studies are briefly reviewed in Section 2. The 
data are discussed in Section 3. The empirical analyses and results are presented in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2     Background  
By the late 1980s, the offshoring of innovation was already widespread (Cantwell 1995). 
This motivated a wide range of studies in International Business, the Economics of 
Innovation, and International Economics. Though there are some earlier research on this 
topic (e.g., Ronstadt 1977; Mansfield, Teece, and Romeo 1979; Lall 1979), most of the 
contributions to this literature are made as of early 1990s (e.g., Pearce and Singh 1992; 
Granstrand, Håkansson, and Sjölander 1992; Dunning 1994).5 Since then, this literature 
has grown significantly. The most recent studies explore, at least, four areas of research: 
the determinants of global sourcing of innovative activities (e.g., Lewin et al. 2009; 
Garcìa-Vega and Huergo 2011; Jensen and Pedersen 2012; Jabbour and Zuniga 2016; 
Danguy 2016; Tamayo and Huergo 2016), the potential gains (e.g., Kotabe et al. 2007; 
Ceci and Masciarelli 2010; Nieto and Rodrìguez 2011; Castellani and Pieri 2013; Tabrizy 
2015), the organizational aspects (e.g., Bardhan 2006; Lai et al. 2009; Grimaldi et al. 
2010; Martinez-Noya et al. 2012; Bertrand and Mol 2013), and the emerging global 
geography of innovation (e.g., Fifarek and Veloso 2010 and D'Agostino, Laursen, and 
Santangelo 2013).  
Against this background, this study contributes to two lines of research. By focusing 
on firms' productivity, it improves our understanding of the determinants of global 
sourcing of innovative activities. It also provides a detailed description of the 
productivity requirements for offshoring different types of tasks, including R&D, design, 
and engineering tasks. 
																																																								
5	Focusing on the crucial role of MNCs in the global distribution of innovative tasks, Narula and Zanfei 
(2005) review some of those contributions.	
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There are two recent studies that incorporate the variations in productivity into their 
theoretical and empirical models of offshoring innovation. Garcìa-Vega and Huergo 
(2011) introduce a model in which firms with heterogeneous productivity may outsource 
their innovative activities to domestic or foreign parties. They suggest that probability of 
outsourcing R&D internationally is greater for exporters, who are more productive than 
non-exporters. They also examine how financial constraints and lack of information may 
affect the probability of this international sourcing. Motivated by their theoretical 
propositions, they use a sample of Spanish firms, and employ selected measures of 
absorptive capacity (e.g., continuous R&D engagements, R&D employments, size, etc.) 
as independent variables that control for variations in productivity. Their estimation 
results suggest that, in general, firms with greater absorptive capacity are more likely to 
outsource their R&D internationally.6 Jabbour and Zuniga (2016), who examine a sample 
of French firms, also employ a measure of technology gap as an independent variable that 
controls for variations in productivity. They measure this gap by comparing the estimated 
total factor productivity of a given firm with the productivity of the leader in the sector. 
Their estimation results suggest that firms with smaller technology gap, whose 
productivity is relatively closer to that of the leading firm in the sector, are more likely to 
offshore their R&D. Holding all else constant, therefore, these two studies suggest that 
firms with greater absorptive capacity and productivity are more likely to offshore their 
innovative activities.7  
This study contributes to the above line of research in two ways. First, I employ an 
estimated measure of total factor productivity. Employing this measure, which is also 
used in Jabbour and Zuniga (2016), I am able to add upon the findings reported in 
Garcìa-Vega and Huergo (2011). Unlike these studies, however, I follow Altomonte, 
Aquilante, and Ottaviano (2012, Ch. 4) and employ the estimated productivity as 
dependent variable, rather than control covariate, to focus on productivity premium. 
Second, I use a sample which is representative of all manufacturing firms in Europe 
																																																								
6	Martinez-Noya et al. (2012) report similar findings. They suggest that firms with more technological 
resources and capabilities, measured by R&D intensity and number of patents, are more likely to offshore 
their R&D.	
7	Measures of absorptive capacity and productivity are employed only as control covariates in these studies, 
and it is difficult to infer any causal relationships from the reported results.	
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(innovating and non-innovating), rather than a sample which is only representative of 
innovating firms.8 
A number of empirical studies also examine the superior productivity of international 
firms. This paper relates to three of them, in which the productivity of the firms that 
integrate (domestically or abroad) and/or outsource (domestically or abroad) part of their 
productive activities are examined.9 In a sample of Italian manufacturing firms, Federico 
(2010) finds that the most productive firms tend to integrate abroad, and that the firms 
with medium-high productivity integrate domestically. He also finds that the firms with 
medium-low productivity choose foreign outsourcing, and that the least productive firms 
outsource domestically. Unlike the prediction in Antràs and Helpman (2004), his findings 
imply that, regardless of the destination of productive activities, firms that integrate 
(either abroad or domestically) are more productive than firms that outsource (either 
abroad or domestically). Also, Kohler and Smolka (2012) examine a sample of Spanish 
firms. They verify that global sourcing requires greater productivity. They also find that, 
in general, integration requires greater productivity than outsourcing. Lastly, in a sample 
of Japanese international firms, Tomiura (2007) finds that the most productive firms tend 
to integrate offshore, while the less productive ones tend to outsource abroad. He also 
finds that the least productive firms remain at home. This pattern is well in line with the 
sorting in Antràs and Helpman (2004). 
This study contributes to the above line of research by taking into account different 
types of tasks that may be performed offshore. The above studies do not distinguish 
between productivity requirements for the offshoring of different types of tasks (e.g., 
productive vs. innovative), nor do they explicitly examine the productivity requirement 
for the offshoring of innovative tasks. However, the survey used in this study enables me 
to compare the superior productivity of firms with offshore innovative activities to those 
																																																								
8 	Garcìa-Vega and Huergo (2011) employ a sample of innovating firms in Spain, using Panel de 
Innovaciòn Tecnològica. Jabbour and Zuniga (2016) employ another sample of innovating firms in France, 
using Enquête Recherche et Developement.	
9	To be clear, I need to define some of the terms that I use in this paper: Firms “integrate” their productive 
activities into another firm once they distribute those tasks across affiliated parties (e.g., foreign or 
domestic M&A). They “outsource” those activities to another firm once they distribute them across un-
affiliated parties (e.g., arms length agreements with foreign or domestic firms). Given these two definitions, 
“offshoring” would generally refer to a case in which the second party is located in a foreign country, no 
matter if it is affiliated or not. When the foreign party is affiliated with the firm, it is usually called “captive 
offshoring.” When it is not affiliated, it is called “offshore outsouring.”	
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firms that offshore different types of productive activities as well as exporters and 
domestic firms.  
 
3     Data  
Firm-level observations used in this study come from the European Firms in a Global 
Economy (EFIGE) survey.10 The main focus of this survey is on international activities, 
but it also provides further information about the structure of the firms, their workforce, 
investments, innovative activities, markets, and finances. The data set includes a well-
stratified sample of about 15,000 manufacturing firms in 7 European countries.11 For 
some of these firms, the survey in use provides the estimated Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) total factor productivity (henceforth, TFP). I make use of this sub-sample, which 
includes 7,435 firms from Austria (25 firms), France (1,605 firms), Germany (579 firms), 
Hungary (179 firms), Italy (2,243 firms), Spain (2,410 firms), and the UK (394 firms). 
Altomonte et al. (2012) suggest that, compared to the full sample, this sub-sample does 
not show any bias in terms of representation by category of firms (domestic vs. active 
abroad).12 
The data were collected in 2010. Though some of the questions are about the 
averages from 2007 to 2009, most of them reflect the information for the last available 
budget year: 2008. Thus, I am only able to make cross-sectional comparisons in this 
study. 
The TFP measure in use is estimated via firms' value added, deflated by the industry-
specific price indicies. This measure is part of the residual of an estimated Cobb-Douglas 
production function in which the number of employees, the value of tangible fixed assets, 
and the value of intermediate inputs are employed to predict the value added for any 
given firm.13  
																																																								
10	The EFIGE survey has been conducted by Bruegel, a European think tank, along with seven other 
partners, and it is supported by the Directorate General Research of the European Commission.	
11	The stratification process is described in Barba Navaretti et al. (2011, pp. 57-60). The resulting sample 
includes 14,759 firms from Austria (443 firms), France (2,973 firms), Germany (2,935 firms), Hungary 
(488 firms), Italy (3,021 firms), Spain (2,832 firms), and the UK (2,067 firms).	
12	See Tables 2 and 3 in Altomonte et al. (2012) for more details.	
13	Altomonte et al. (2012) provide more information on the estimation procedure (pp. 59-60) and the 
validation of the measure (pp. 21-26).	
 8 
Also, this survey provides detailed information about the type of offshore activities in 
which firms are involved. In particular, one can observe whether any given MNC 
offshores the production of its finished products, the production of its semi-finished 
products/components, and/or its R&D, design, and engineering activities. These activities 
are performed offshore either through FDI or contracts and arms length agreements. 
This survey provides an ideal dataset for this empirical exercise since one has access 
to an unbiased estimation of firm-level TFP as well as detailed information about the type 
of tasks that are performed offshore. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, about 6.24% of the firms in the sample (464 firms) offshore 
the production of their finished products abroad (either via FDI or contracts and arms 
length agreements); about 4.28% (318 firms) offshore the production of their semi-
finished products/components; and only about 1.28% (95 firms) offshore their R&D, 
design, and engineering activities abroad. Interestingly enough, the majority of MNCs 
that offshore their innovative tasks are also involved in other offshore activities: 77 firms 
offshore the production of their finished products, and 61 firms offshore the production of 
their semi-finished products/components. Further, there are 50 firms that are involved in 
all three activities. On average, those 50 firms are more productive than other MNCs. The 
mean of the estimated TFP measure for those firms is about 0.33 (with standard deviation 
of 0.52), while the same mean for other MNCs is about 0.05 (with standard deviation of 
0.66).14 
This survey also provides for a wide range of control covariates. In what follows, I 
control for the variations in the TFP across countries and sectors using a vector of 
indicator variables. Firms in this survey are scattered around 7 European countries and 11 
industries. Though the country of incorporation is available, it is impossible to identify 
the industry in which a given firm is involved. In fact, a randomized industry identifier is 
used in this survey to keep the data confidential.15  
																																																								
14	One may safely reject the null hypothesis for the equality of the above means, and accept the alternative 
that the average productivity for the group of firms that are involved in all three activities is greater than the 
average productivity for the other MNCs (p-value=0.04%).	
15	In email correspondence, one of the research fellows at Bruegel provided a list of industries that are 
included in this survey. However, the randomized industry identifiers for these industries remain unknown. 
The industries include: Manufacture of Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Products; Manufacture of Food 
Product, Beverage, and Tobacco; Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Products; Manufacture of Textiles 
and Textile Products, plus Manufacture of Pulp, Paper, and Paper Products (Publishing And Printing);  
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I also control for exporting and innovative activities. It is well-established that 
exporters and R&D performers are more productive than non-exporters and non-R&D 
firms, respectively. Thus, I employ an export status dummy along with a R&D 
performance status dummy as control covariates. For a given firm the export status 
dummy is set to be equal to one when the amount of exports is equal or greater than 10% 
of the annual turnover in 2008, and zero otherwise. About 43% of firms in the sample 
(3,211 firms) are identified as exporters. Also, for a given firm the R&D performance 
status dummy is set to be equal to one when, on average, the amount of R&D investments 
in 2007, 2008, and 2009 is greater or equal to 2% of the annual turnovers, and zero 
otherwise. About 40% of firms in the sample (2,967 firms) are identified as R&D 
performers. 
Lastly, I control for an ordinal size measure, which is based on the firms' annual 
turnover. This measure is useful to control for some unobservable size-specific variations 
that cannot be controlled for in cross-section estimations. The ordinal size measure is 
based on the annual turnover of the firms in 2008. The turnover categories include: less 
than 1 million euros, between 1 and 2, 2 and 10, 10 and 15, 15 and 50, 50 and 250, or 
more than 250 million euros. The majority of firms in the survey (43.47%) have reported 
an annual turnover between 2 and 10 million euros. Also, the annual turnover of about 
20% of the firms is between 1 and 2 million euros. For about 12% of the firms this figure 
is between 15 and 50 million euros. Less than 25% of the sample belong to the other four 
turnover categories combined. 
As summarized in Table 1, large firms (with annual turnover greater than 15 million 
euros in 2008) make up for a significant share of firms that are involved in global 
sourcing. In fact, about half of the firms that offshore the production of their finished 
products or semi-finished products/components are large. Also, when it comes to global 
sourcing of innovative tasks, 72% of the firms that offshore their R&D, design, and 
engineering activities are large, which may be an indicator of their superior productivity.  
																																																																																																																																																																					
Manufacture of Leather and Leather Products, plus Manufacture of Other Non Metallic Mineral Product, 
plus Manufacture of Electrical and Optical Equipment; Manufacture of Chemicals, Chemical Products, 
and Man-Made Fibres; Manufacture of Transport Equipment; Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products; 
Manufacturing N.E.C.; Manufacture of Machine and Equipment N.E.C.; and Sector No. 9. Since a very 
small number of firms are involved in Sector No. 9, no information could be provided about the type of 
activities in that sector.	
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4     Empirical Analyses  
In this section, I first employ a univariate kernel density estimation (henceforth, KDE) for 
the distribution of TFP among the MNCs that are involved in different types of offshore 
activities (Section 4.1). Given the estimated kernel densities, I employ linear and ordered 
Probit estimations to test the working hypothesis that MNCs with offshore innovative 
activities are more productive than other MNCs, exporters, and domestic firms (Section 
4.2). I then report the regression results (Section 4.3). I conclude this section with a brief 
discussion of competing theories in light of the empirical findings of this paper (Section 
4.4).16  
 
4.1   Kernel Density Estimation  
Figure 2 plots the KDE for the distribution of TFP among the firms that have performed 
the following tasks offshore: the production of finished products, the production of semi-
finished products/components, or R&D, design, and engineering activities.17 As indicated 
earlier, these activities are not mutually exclusive. For instance, there are 50 firms in the 
sample that partake in all three of them. To make a better comparison, Figure 2 also plots 
the KDE for the distribution of TFP among the firms with no FDI or contracts and arms 
length agreements.   
For a given group of firms, the estimated KDE is employed to identify the probability 
that firms' productivity is greater than a given TFP level. Among MNCs, the estimated 
densities suggest that the probability that firms' productivity is greater than a given TFP 
level is higher among firms with offshore innovative activities compared to those with 
offshore productive activities, including the production of finished products or semi-
finished products/components. This pattern implies that MNCs that offshore their R&D, 
design, and engineering activities are more productive than MNCs that offshore their 
productive activities. It also appears that firms that offshore the production of their 
finished products are more productive than firms that offshore the production of their 
																																																								
16	I am grateful to an anonymous referee, who suggested that I add this discussion to the manuscript.	
17	Altomonte et al. (2012) provide some illustrations of kernel densities for different types of international 
activities such as exporting and importing. They also take into account some of the activities that are 
related to global sourcing. By looking at different types of tasks that are performed offshore, this paper 
provides a detailed picture of the productivity differences across the firms that are involved in different 
types of global sourcing.	
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semi-finished products/components.18 Lastly, regardless of the type of activity performed 
offshore, MNCs are more productive than firms with no FDI or contracts and arms length 
agreements.  
 
4.2   Regression 
The above KDE results form the working hypothesis for the following regression 
analyses: Those MNCs that offshore their innovative tasks are more productive than 
MNCs that offshore their non-innovative tasks. Those MNCs are also more productive 
than exporters as well as firms that only serve the domestic markets. To test this 
hypothesis, I first employ the following regression function:  
 
! !"#! !"#$! ,!! = !!!"#$! + !!!!! + ! !! !"#$! ,!!                      (1) 
 
where TFPi is either the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production function for firm i, 
estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach, or it is the TFP decile to 
which TFPi belongs. I use linear techniques when I employ the TFP measures directly, 
and I use ordered Probit techniques when I employ the deciles on the left-hand side. 
Orndi is a dummy variable, which takes value one when firm i performs its R&D, design, 
and engineering activities offshore, and zero otherwise. Xi is a vector of control 
covariates, including an exporter status dummy, a R&D performance status dummy, and 
a set of ordinal size dummies. Further, this vector includes a set of sector and country 
dummies. This regression function also includes a constant term. 
I estimate the parameters of the above model (Equation 1) in the full sample as well 
as the sub-sample of MNCs. The working hypothesis implies that α1 is positive and 
statistically significant. 
The model given by Equation 1 can also be presented differently. For this purpose, I 
define a dummy variable, Ofini, which takes value one when firm i does not offshore its 
innovative activities, yet it produces some finished products offshore. Ofini is zero 
otherwise. I define another dummy variable, Osemi, which takes value one when firm i 
																																																								
18	Since the main focus of this paper is on global sourcing of innovative activities, I do not explore the 
difference in productivity between MNCs that offshore the production of their finished products and MNCs 
that offshore the production of their semi-finished products/components. Nonetheless, the above KDE 
results may be taken as a preliminary evidence for the superior productivity of the former group.	
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does not offshore its innovative activities or the production of its finished products, yet it 
produces some semi-finished products/components offshore. Osemi is zero otherwise. 
There are also 50 MNCs for which the type of offshore activities are unknown. I define a 
dummy variable, Otheri, for those firms.19 Xi being the same as given in Equation 1, the 
alternative regression function is as follows: 
 
! !"#! !"#$! ,!"#$! ,!"ℎ!"! ,!! = 
!!"!"#$! + !!!!"#$! + !!"!"ℎ!"! + !!!!! + ! !! !"#$! ,!"#$! ,!"ℎ!"! ,!!             (2) 
  
I estimate the parameters of the above model (Equation 2) only in the sub-sample of 
MNCs, which enables me to compare the productivity of MNCs that perform (part of) 
their innovative activities (and possibly other types of productive activities) offshore with 
those that produce (part of) their finished products (and possibly their semi-finished 
products/components) offshore and also with those that only produce (part of) their semi-
finished products/components offshore. Though this is a slightly different regression 
function, the results are expected to be quite close to the estimation results for Equation 
1. The working hypothesis implies that α21 and α22 are negative and statistically 
significant.20   
 
4.3   Results   
Regression results confirm the pattern that emerges in the KDE plots: Conditional upon a 
wide range of covariates, those MNCs that offshore their innovative activities are more 
productive than other firms in the full sample and the sub-sample of MNCs. Table 2 
offers more details.  
The linear and ordered Probit results for the full sample estimations are reported in 
columns I-1 and II-1 in Table 2, respectively. The results are quite predictable. 
Regardless of the types of activities that are performed offshore, MNCs are expected to 
be more productive than other firms. In fact, the estimation results verify this: Compared 
																																																								
19	Those 50 MNCs are not included in Figure 1.	
20	Since I do not know the type of offshore activities in which the firms in Other category are involved, I do 
not have any priors for the sign of α23.	
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to other firms, including exporters and domestic firms, those MNCs that offshore their 
innovative activities are more productive. 
As for the control covariates, the estimated coefficient for exporter status dummy is 
statistically not different from zero, while the estimated coefficient for R&D performance 
dummy is positive and statistically significant. Also, compared to small firms (with less 
than 1 million euros of turnover in 2008), larger firms are more productive. As annual 
turnover increases, the magnitude of correlation between ordinal size measures and TFP 
increases while the standard deviations remain almost intact.21 
 Since I control for ordinal size measures, the insignificant correlation between 
exporting activities and measures of TFP may not be striking. What is interesting, 
however, is the significant correlation between R&D performance and TFP. The results 
suggests that R&D performers are significantly more productive than non-R&D firms 
even after I control for the firms' size and other covariates.  
As indicated in Section 4.2, I do not know the precise type of activities that are 
offshored by 50 MNCs in this sample. To make sure that the results are not driven by 
those MNCs, I drop them from the sample, and re-estimate the parameters of interest.22 
The results remain intact. Columns I-2 and II-2 in Table 2 offer more details. 
The results for the sub-sample of MNCs are more interesting: Compared to other 
MNCs who do not perform any innovative activities abroad, those MNCs that offshore 
their R&D, design, and engineering activities are more productive. The linear and 
ordered Probit results, reported in columns I-1 and II-1 in Table 3, are strong evidence of 
the superior productivity among the MNCs with offshore innovative efforts. In those 
estimations, the control groups are the other MNCs in the sample. Some of those MNCs 
in the control group offshore the production of their finished products or semi-finished 
products/components, and a minority of them (50 firms) are involved in other types of 
offshore activities that are unknown to me. The estimation results suggest that there exists 
a positive and significant correlation between the offshoring of innovative activities and 
the TFP measures. To illustrate this correlation, Figure 3 plots the estimated magnitude of 
																																																								
21	For instance, one can safely reject the null hypothesis of the equality of estimated coefficients for ordinal 
size measures when the base-line results, reported in column I-1, are used. Detailed test results available 
upon request.	
22	I am grateful to an anonymous referee, who raised this point.	
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the productivity premium of MNCs with offshore innovative activities over other MNCs. 
The estimated magnitudes are based on the marginal effects of the ordered Probit 
estimation reported in column II-1 in Table 3. Those MNCs that offshore their innovative 
activities are about 7.7% more likely to belong to the 10th decile of the TFP distribution. 
They are also about 4.4% more likely to belong to the 9th decile of the TFP distribution.23 
Compared to other MNCs, therefore, the results suggest that those MNCs that offshore 
their innovative activities are likely to be more productive. 
As for the control covariates, the estimated coefficients for exporter and R&D 
performer status dummies are statistically not different from zero, which may be the 
consequence of controlling for size. Also, a cross-sectional comparison among MNCs 
suggests that larger MNCs appear to be more productive. Like above, with an increase in 
annual turnover, the correlations between ordinal size measures and TFP measures 
increase. 
I also drop those MNCs for which the type of off-shore activities are unknown, and 
re-estimate the parameters of interest to make sure that the results are not sensitive. The 
results remain intact again. Columns I-2 and II-2 in Table 3 offer more details. 
The above results can also be presented in a slightly different way, as given by 
Equation 2, in which the control group is made of the MNCs that offshore their 
innovative activities. The linear and ordered Probit results, reported in columns I-1 and 
II-1 in Table 4, suggest that those MNCs that do not partake in global sourcing of 
innovative tasks, for which Ofin, Osem, or Other are equal to one, are less productive 
than MNCs with offshore innovative activities. The estimated coefficients for control 
covariates are similar to the estimations that are reported in Table 3. Also, excluding the 
MNCs for which the precise type of offshore activities are unknown does not change the 
results (columns I-2 and II-2 in Table 4).   
 
4.4   Discussion  
The underlying question in this empirical assessment relates to the governance of 
innovative activities in open economies. The above evidence suggest that only a small 
number of very productive firms are able to offshore their R&D, design, and engineering 
																																																								
23	The estimated marginal effects for each decile, as given by the solid line in Figure 3, add up to zero. 
Detailed estimations of the cut-off coeficients available upon request.	
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activities. These firms are more productive than other MNCs that only offshore their 
productive activities. Previous studies also suggest that, when it comes to international 
sourcing of innovation, captive offshoring is more common than offshore outsourcing 
(Tabrizy 2015), and it is more effective (Nieto and Rodrìguez 2011). 
These findings support the theoretical proposition that the most productive firms are 
likely to engage in global sourcing (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004). They also 
support the proposition that captive offshoring via FDI requires greater productivity than 
offshore outsourcing (Antràs and Helpman 2004). Yet, the implications of these findings 
go beyond these propositions, as they point out to the differences that may exist in 
productivity requirements for offshoring different types of tasks (e.g., productive vs. 
innovative). When it comes to productive activities, Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl 
(2006) offer a theoretical framework that accommodates varying productivity 
requirements for the offshoring of activities that relate to employing intermediate inputs 
versus assembly. 24  To the best of my knowledge, however, there is no general 
equilibrium model that incorporates the differences in productivity requirements for the 
offshoring of activities that relate to production versus innovation.25 Such model could be 
based on the greater cost of offshoring innovative activities due to potential intellectual 
property risks. At relatively high levels of intellectual property risks, only the most 
productive firms can afford to perform their innovative tasks offshore. Firms, in such 
model, should be productive enough to partake in global sourcing, but they should be 
very productive to partake in global sourcing of their innovative tasks. Better intellectual 
property protection may lower the cost of this particular type of offshoring, which in turn 
leads more firms to offshore their innovative tasks. 
																																																								
24	With relatively low fixed cost of captive offshoring in intermediate activities, their model suggest that 
the least productive firms may engage in FDI in intermediates, while the rest of the firms may engage in 
FDI in intermediates and assembly. However, a different sorting may emerge following an increase in the 
fixed cost of captive offshoring in intermediate activities: firms with relatively low levels of productivity do 
not continue with their FDI in intermediates, while firms with greater productivity continue with their FDI 
in intermediates and assembly. With relatively high fixed cost of captive offshoring in intermediate 
activities, most of the firms do not engage in FDI. Firms with relatively higher level of productivity may 
engage in FDI in assembly. And the most productive firms continue with their FDI in intermediates and 
assembly.	
25	Given that they focus on the effect of financial constraints and the risk of information leakage, the 
framework developed by Garcìa-Vega and Huergo (2011) does not accommodate for the above differences.	
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These findings may also support the learning path hypothesis developed by Maskell 
et al. (2007). Focusing on offshore outsourcing, they suggest that MNCs go through a 
sequential learning process from the offshoring of their productive tasks, which may be 
driven by cost minimization motives, to the offshoring of their innovative tasks, which 
may lead to differentiation advantages. The empirical evidence are so far inconclusive. 
While Maskell et al. (2007) find some empirical support for this proposition in a sample 
of Danish MNCs, Jabbour and Zuniga (2016) do not find enough support in a sample of 
French innovating firms. Though in this study I do not have access to longitudinal data, 
the cross-sectional evidence, reported in Section 3, suggest that the majority of MNCs 
with offshore innovation are also involved in the offshoring of their finished products 
and/or semi-finished products/components.26 This pattern is consistent with the above 
learning hypothesis.  
 
5     Conclusion  
Despite the estimated gains from global sourcing of innovative tasks (Ceci and 
Masciarelli 2010; Kotabe et al. 2007; Nieto and Rodrìguez 2011; Tabrizy 2015), only a 
small number of MNCs offshore their innovative activities. This is puzzling. In an 
attempt to provide an answer to this puzzle, I explore the superior productivity of the 
MNCs with offshore innovative activities compared to the other firms in the full sample 
and the sub-sample of MNCs. The results suggest that not only are those MNCs more 
productive than other firms in the full sample, but they are also significantly more 
productive than other MNCs. This superior productivity may explain why only a small 
number of MNCs partake in the offshoring of innovation. 
Two caveats should be noted. First, the TFP measure in use is based on the residuals 
of a firm-specific Cobb-Douglas production function, which is estimated using the 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach. Thus, the dependent variable may suffer from 
measurement error. Unless the measurement error is well-behaved, the precision of the 
estimated parameter of interest can be a bit weak (Green 2012, pp. 97-99). That said, the 
estimated Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) productivity is among the most reliable TFP 
measures, which is widely used in empirical studies. Second, a shock to the error term in 
																																																								
26	See Figure 1 for more details.	
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the regression function, as given by Equation 1, not only affects the TFP measure, but it 
may also affect the likelihood that a firm partakes in global sourcing of innovative tasks. 
This endogeneity may also cause biased estimations. To address this endogeneity, 
however, one should either have access to a randomized trial or employ an exogenous 
variations to predict whether a firm offshores its innovative activities. That way, one can 
precisely estimate how the offshoring of innovative tasks may affect firms' productivity. 
In the absence of such trials and exogenous variations, this paper is among the first 
studies that look into the productivity requirements for offshoring different types of tasks. 
The results imply that those MNCs that belong to the highest two deciles of productivity 
are more likely to be able to partake in the offshoring of innovative tasks. This 
productivity requirement may explain why only a small number of firms gain from the 
global task distribution in innovative activities. 
The key finding of this article has at least two policy implications for the countries 
that intend to host innovative activities. First, attracting foreign investments in R&D, 
design, and engineering activities may require the participation of the most productive 
MNCs. As indicated in Section 3, these MNCs are likely to be larger in size. They are 
also likely to be among the leading firms in their industry (Jabbour and Zuniga 2016). 
Second, as discussed in Section 4.4, improvements in intellectual property protection at a 
given destination may lower the cost of offshoring innovative activities to that country. 
Also, given the cost of offhoring such activities, MNCs are more likely to internalize 
their offshore innovative activities via FDI (Tabrizy 2015). Thus, improvements in 
intellectual property rights and foreign ownership rules may increase the chance of a 
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Table 1: Number of firms involved in different types of off-shore activities, categorized 
based on their annual turnover in 2008. 
 Number of firms who off-shore: 
Annual turnover in 
2008 
(in million euros) 
the production of their 
finished products 
the production of their 
semi-finished 
products/components 
their R&D, design 
and engineering 
activities 
< 1 3 4 1 
1-2 18 10 1 
2-10 145 115 21 
10-15 48 39 3 
15-50 115 76 26 
50-250 86 49 24 
> 250 46 25 18 
Total 461 a 318 94 b 
Share of Large Firms c 53% 47% 72% 
Note: 
a) The turnover information is not available for 3 firms in this category. 
b) The turnover information is not available for 1 firm in this category. 































Table 2: Full sample regression results   
 Estimation of the Parameters in Equation 1 (Full sample) 
 OLS Ordered Probit 
 TFP TFP TFP Deciles TFP Deciles 
 I-1 I-2 II-1 II-2 
Ornd 0.126** 0.125** 0.200* 0.200* 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.118) (0.118) 
Exporter -0.016 -0.016 -0.042 -0.043 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.027) (0.027) 
R&D Performer 0.023** 0.023** 0.059** 0.059** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.026) 
Annual turnover:     
1-2 million euros 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.342*** 0.342*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.048) (0.048) 
2-10 million euros 0.313*** 0.314*** 0.868*** 0.870*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.046) (0.046) 
10-15 million euros 0.488*** 0.488*** 1.343*** 1.344*** 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.064) (0.065) 
15-50 million euros 0.578*** 0.581*** 1.616*** 1.622*** 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.060) (0.060) 
50-250 million euros 0.852*** 0.850*** 2.227*** 2.221*** 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.077) (0.078) 
More than 250 million euros 1.053*** 1.059*** 2.755*** 2.770*** 
(0.048) (0.049) (0.135) (0.136) 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 7,426 7,376 7,426 7,376 
R2 0.289 0.288   
Pseudo R2   0.087 0.087 
Notes: The control vector includes an export status dummy, a R&D performance status dummy, ordinal 
size dummies, sector dummies, and country dummies. The regression function includes a constant term. 




















Table 3: Sub-sample regression results   
 Estimation of the Parameters in Equation 1 (Sub-sample) 
 OLS Ordered Probit 
 TFP TFP TFP Deciles TFP Deciles 
 I-1 I-2 II-1 II-2 
Ornd 0.200*** 0.205*** 0.330** 0.348** 
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.135) (0.136) 
Exporter 0.012 0.004 0.051 0.024 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.094) (0.099) 
R&D Performer 0.024 0.029 0.067 0.075 
 (0.046) (0.048) (0.089) (0.093) 
Annual turnover:     
1-2 million euros 0.191 0.175 0.665 0.608 
(0.170) (0.170) (0.639) (0.640) 
2-10 million euros 0.397** 0.385** 1.321** 1.321** 
(0.167) (0.171) (0.637) (0.643) 
10-15 million euros 0.526*** 0.511*** 1.740*** 1.728*** 
(0.175) (0.180) (0.647) (0.655) 
15-50 million euros 0.572*** 0.565*** 1.983*** 1.991*** 
(0.183) (0.188) (0.648) (0.654) 
50-250 million euros 0.910*** 0.880*** 2.693*** 2.648*** 
(0.176) (0.181) (0.658) (0.665) 
More than 250 million euros 1.139*** 1.139*** 3.297*** 3.320*** 
(0.180) (0.183) (0.665) (0.671) 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 630 580 630 580 
R2 0.277 0.273   
Pseudo R2   0.110 0.110 
Notes: The control vector includes an export status dummy, a R&D performance status dummy, ordinal 
size dummies, sector dummies, and country dummies. The regression function includes a constant term. 





















Table 4: Sub-sample regression results   
 Estimation of the Parameters in Equation 2 (Sub-sample) 
 OLS Ordered Probit 
 TFP TFP TFP Deciles TFP Deciles 
 I-1 I-2 II-1 II-2 
Ofin -0.192*** -0.196*** -0.318** -0.337** 
 (0.063) (0.0639) (0.136) (0.137) 
Osem -0.240** -0.243** -0.378** -0.392** 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.174) (0.176) 
Other -0.183**  -0.327  
 (0.089)  (0.203)  
Exporter 0.011 0.00309 0.051 0.0236 
 (0.051) (0.0532) (0.094) (0.0986) 
R&D Performer 0.027 0.0316 0.070 0.0777 
 (0.046) (0.0486) (0.090) (0.0937) 
Annual turnover:     
1-2 million euros 0.177 0.163 0.647 0.591 
(0.170) (0.170) (0.641) (0.642) 
2-10 million euros 0.384** 0.374** 1.305** 1.306** 
(0.168) (0.171) (0.639) (0.644) 
10-15 million euros 0.514*** 0.500*** 1.724*** 1.713*** 
(0.176) (0.181) (0.649) (0.656) 
15-50 million euros 0.560*** 0.553*** 1.966*** 1.976*** 
(0.187) (0.193) (0.650) (0.656) 
50-250 million euros 0.893*** 0.865*** 2.672*** 2.628*** 
(0.179) (0.184) (0.660) (0.667) 
More than 250 million euros 1.122*** 1.123*** 3.277*** 3.301*** 
(0.183) (0.187) (0.667) (0.673) 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 630 580 630 580 
R2 0.278 0.273   
Pseudo R2   0.110 0.110 
Notes: The control vector includes an export status dummy, a R&D performance status dummy, ordinal 
size dummies, sector dummies, and country dummies. The regression function includes a constant term. 



















Figure 1: Number of firms involved in different types of off-shore activities 
Figure 2: Kernel density estimation for the distribution of TFP among MNCs 
Figure 3: The estimated marginal effects for different productivity deciles based on the 


































































































Note: The marginal effects are based on the estimation results reported in Table 3, column II-1. 
 
